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Theo A. F. Kuipers
ANOTHER START FOR ABDUCTION AIMING AT EMPIRICAL 
PROGRESS
REPLY TO JOKE MEHEUS 
As mentioned already in my reply to Aliseda, Joke Meheus was the second one 
to take up the challenge that I presented in 1998 and published in 1999, viz. to 
design a method, a logic or a computer program, for abducing a revised 
hypothesis that is empirically more successful than a given one. Whereas 
Aliseda starts from Beth’s semantic tableaux method, Meheus starts from 
Batens’ adaptive logic program. In this reply I would like to evaluate the 
question to what extent the specific logic developed by Joke Meheus meets the 
challenge. But let me start by stressing that, although her logic is in many 
respects incomplete, I appreciate it very much, for it seems a very promising 
start. She shows at least that the Ghentian style of ampliative adaptive logic 
enables one separately and comparatively to evaluate abductive individual 
hypotheses. More precisely, given a set of (general) background beliefs and 
(individual) observations, explanatory hypotheses can be derived by using a set 
of rules, consisting of the classical rules, amplified with some general and some 
specific ones, in a stepwise, adaptive way, that is, in the course of a proof, a 
previously derived conclusion may have to be withdrawn. In fact, it is a 
two-level construction; the adaptive, first-order, logic itself and a modal proof 
theory for it. The result is that hypotheses and predictions appear as possibilities 
in view of the background knowledge and the given observations. Besides the 
general rules and marking criteria for a general logic for abduction (LA), some 
specific rules and criteria are needed to get a specific logic for empirical 
progress (LAk), abducing the maximally successful hypothesis, if any. 
If I see it correctly, LAk still has some severe restrictions, which might be 
withdrawn later. To begin with, as Meheus remarks herself, it is essentially 
restricted to hypotheses explaining surprising or novel events, that is, events that 
are not only not entailed by the background knowledge but also compatible with 
it. Moreover, it seems to be restricted to singular explanatory hypotheses. Last 
but not least, it essentially deals with the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses, 
not with their generation. In the rest of this reply, I first deal with the restriction 
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to singular hypotheses explaining surprising events, before turning to the 
generation issue. 
Singular Hypotheses Explaining Novel Events 
Let me start by noting that given the restriction to novel events, an explanatory 
hypothesis may be seen as a candidate for empirical progress relative to the 
background beliefs alone. The “old” hypothesis, to be replaced by a “new” one, 
may just be the tautology. However, as becomes clear from the final example 
(1)-(17), with (3) replaced by (3c), the method may also first lead to a hypothesis 
(11) that is later replaced by a better one (16). Hence, both separate and 
comparative evaluation is covered by the method. This seems to suggest how to 
proceed with anomalous observations, that is, observations in conflict with the 
background beliefs, at least as soon as the conflicting background beliefs can be 
shown to be a proper subset. In that case, the natural question is whether the 
conjunctive hypothesis of these beliefs can first be derived in LAk , possibly 
with using older observations, and then be replaced by a better one.
Let us now turn to the apparent restriction to singular hypotheses. If I see it 
correctly, hypotheses can only come in the game by RC in LA and, in addition, 
by RCk in LAk. The question is whether, in both cases, the modally 
hypothesized A can be of the same conditional logical form as (the non-modal 
versions of) the background beliefs are apparently assumed to have. This form is 
essential for general explanatory hypotheses. In its simplest form, the question is 
whether LA(k) can deal with (conditional) inductive generalizations. Be this as it 
may, my impression is that, if not, it will not be too difficult to adapt the method 
for this purpose. In both cases, a toy example might be very helpful. 
 There remains the question of the generalization of the method to the general 
instrumentalist abduction task, that is, the generation and evaluation of theory 
revision in the face of remaining counterexamples. For the evaluative side I 
should like to refer to my reply to Aliseda, whose method is in a similar position 
in this respect. However, regarding the generation side, the situation seems to be 
different.
Generation
As Aliseda (1997) has pointed out, abduction in the sense of Peirce essentially 
covers the generation and evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. However, 
LA
(k) does not generate a hypothesis, but evaluates it, in the sense that there may 
be routes of reasoning such that the hypothesis may be (conditionally) derived 
Theo A. F. Kuipers 220
and not yet have to be withdrawn. The crucial rule RC(k) presupposes that one 
introduces the formula ‘A’ oneself. Hence, the question is whether there is such 
a construction method for one or more of such hypotheses. In this respect, the 
tableau method of Aliseda and the one suggested by Urbanski (2001) seem to 
have an advantage. However, I do not want to rule out that Meheus might give 
her method a constructive turn. To be sure, a decent method to prove that a 
certain hypothesis may be abduced as the most successful one, relative to the 
background beliefs and the available evidence, of those that have been 
considered so far, is of independent, substantial value. 
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